might feel envy or guilt, although this seems more germane to recent experimental evidence that shows a significance of equality of opportunity. (In this article, the terms guilt and envy refer to the utility losses from advantageous inequality and disadvantageous inequality, respectively.)
For instance, in experiments on probabilistic dictator games, subjects are asked to allocate probabilities of winning an indivisible good with a passive recipient. In such experiments, Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2008) ; Bohnet et al. (2008) ; Kircher, Ludwig, and Sandroni (2013) ; and Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) found that a considerable number of subjects chose a probability of winning the good equally.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a step toward filling this gap. We axiomatize a model of an individual's inequality aversion under risk that captures a preference for equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. We call this model the expected inequality-averse (EIA) model. In the EIA model, a unique number captures an individual's preference for equality of opportunity relative to equality of outcome. This parameter determines how the individual behaves when he faces the trade-off between the two notions of equality.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section I, we define the EIA model and show its uniqueness. In Section II, we provide an axiomatic foundation for the EIA model and a characterization of the parameters. In Section III, we show that the EIA model is consistent with the recent experiments on probabilistic dictator games. In Section IV, we discuss recent related literature, namely, Fudenberg and Levine (2012) and Borah (2011) . Finally, in Section V, we discuss an extension of the EIA model. All proofs are in the Appendix.
I. The EIA Model
We assume that the set of payoffs is ℝ. Let I = {1,..., n} be the set of individuals and let 1 denote the decision maker. A vector x = ( x 1 , … , x n ) in ℝ n is called an allocation of payoffs among the individuals. A probability distribution p on ℝ n with finite support is called a lottery. The set of all lotteries is denoted by Δ( ℝ n ). The primitive of our model is a binary relation ≿ on Δ( ℝ n ) that describes the preference of the decision maker (i.e., agent 1 ∈ I ). As usual, ≻ and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of ≿, respectively. The following five axioms characterize the EIA model. The first axiom is standard.
For any p ∈ Δ( ℝ n ), E p is the expectation operator with respect to p. That is, if p is a lottery that yields allocation x s = ( x 1 s , … , x n s ) with probability λ s for each s ∈ {1, … , m}, then E p (x) = ∑ s=1 m λ s x s = ( ∑ s=1 m λ s x 1 s , … , ∑ s=1 m λ s x n s ). In addition, for any real-valued function U on ℝ n , E p (U(x)) = ∑ s=1 m λ s U( x s ). 
where U(x) = x 1 − ∑ i=2 n ( α i max{ x i − x 1 , 0} + β i max{ x 1 − x i , 0}).
The function U corresponds to the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and captures inequality aversion as follows: for each i ≠ 1, the term α i max{ x i − x 1 , 0} captures the disutility of envy when the decision maker's payoff x 1 is smaller than individual i 's payoff x i ; the term β i max{ x 1 − x i , 0} captures the disutility of guilt when the decision maker's payoff x 1 is larger than individual i 's payoff x i .
With this function U, the EIA model captures preferences for the two notions of equality as follows. The term U( E p (x)) represents a preference for equality of opportunity because it captures inequality aversion in the ex ante expected allocations (i.e., E p (x)). In contrast, the term E p (U(x)) represents a preference for equality of outcome because it captures expected inequality aversion in the ex post allocations (i.e., x). Therefore, the weight δ on the first term captures a preference for equality of opportunity relative to equality of outcome.
Remark: Suppose that two EIA models (α, β, δ ) and
In the remark, result (i) means that α and β are uniquely pinned down for the decision maker. Result (ii) means that δ is also uniquely pinned down when the decision maker is inequality averse (i.e., when (α, β) ≠ 0). When the decision maker is not inequality averse (i.e., (α, β) = 0), his utility equals to his expected payoff (i.e.,
. Hence, δ becomes irrelevant to the decision maker's utility.
II. Axioms
Axiom (Rationality): ≿ is complete, transitive, continuous, and monotonic in equal allocations (i.e., (x, … , x) ≿ (y, … , y) if and only if x ≥ y).
1
In the next axiom, conditions (i) and (ii) capture envy and guilt, in that order. In the axiom, (x,(y ) −i ) denotes allocation that gives payoff x only to individual i and gives payoff y to all the other individuals. Remember that 1 ∈ I denotes the decision maker. saito: social preferences under risk Vol. 103 no. 7 To provide a weaker version of the independence axiom, we first define an outcome mixture of allocations as follows:
Definition: For all λ ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ ℝ n , λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ ℝ n is an allocation such that λx + (1 − λ)y = (λ x 1 + (1 − λ) y 1 , … , λ x n + (1 − λ) y n ).
Inequality-averse preferences may violate the independence axiom with respect to outcome mixtures. For example, in (two-agent) deterministic dictator games, a significant number of subjects prefer allocating an endowment equally rather than consuming the whole endowment by themselves ( i.e., ( 0) ) . How ever, the same subjects often prefer consuming the whole endowment by themselves rather than giving it away to the receiver (i.e., (1, 0) ≻ (0, 1)). It follows that (
2 ) , which violates the independence axiom.
2
The source of the violation here is the fact that in the mixed allocations, the rankings of the outcomes are opposite (i.e., the other individual is better off than the decision maker in (0, 1) and worse off in (1, 0)). We want to assume the independence axiom only when the mixture does not involve such opposite outcomes.
Definition: Two allocations x, y ∈ ℝ n are said to be quasi-comonotonic if there is no i ≠ 1 such that x i > x 1 and y i < y 1 .
Note that if x and y are quasi-comonotonic, then the rankings of the payoffs of any individual with respect to the decision maker are not opposite between x and y.
3
Axiom (Quasi-Comonotonic Independence for Outcome Mixture): For all λ ∈ (0, 1] and x, y, z ∈ ℝ n such that the pairs x, z, and y, z are each quasi-comonotonic,
These three axioms characterize Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model on ℝ n (i.e., the set of degenerate lotteries on allocations). (See Lemma 1 in the Appendix for the formal statement.)
The next axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom with respect to probability mixtures. Before stating the axiom, we formally define probability mixtures by using the notation ⊕:
2 Note that mixtures here are not probability mixtures. 3 The definition is a weaker version of comonotonicity provided by Schmeidler (1989) . Schmeidler (1989) presents an interpretation of comonotonicity from the viewpoint of a social planner's inequality aversion, as follows: two allocations x and y are comonotonic if the social rank of any two individuals is not reversed between x and y. When we focus on an individual's inequality-averse preferences, what is relevant to the individual is social rank with respect to the individual himself, not the social rank of any two individuals. 4 For example, lottery p in Figure 1 corresponds to probability mixture 1 _
2
(1, 0) ⊕ 1 _ 2 (0, 1). For simplicity, instead of writing λ δ x ⊕ (1 − λ) δ y , we write λ x ⊕ (1 − λ)y, where δ x and δ y denote the degenerate lotteries that yield x and y with probability 1, respectively.
Just as outcome mixtures may change the rankings of ex post payoffs, probability mixtures may change the rankings of ex ante expected payoffs. However, probability mixtures with an equal allocation (x, … , x) should not change any such rankings. This suggests the following axiom:
Under the above four axioms, for any allocation x, it will be shown that there exists a unique real number z such that (z, … , z) ∼ x. Such a payoff z is denoted by e(x) and is called an equality equivalent. The value e(x) reflects the equality of an allocation x.
The final key axiom, dominance, states that if a lottery p is superior to a lottery q in regard to both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, then p should be preferred to q. To show the axiom, we formalize the two ways to evaluate equality of a lottery based on the two notions of equality. Consider a lottery
is the expected allocation in p. Hence, e( E p (x)) reflects the evaluation of p in terms of equality of opportunity. In contrast, since each e( x s ) reflects the equality of outcome
) is the expected evaluation of p in terms of equality of outcome. By using these two formalizations, we can state the axiom as follows:
To demonstrate how to use the dominance axiom, consider two lotteries
Suppose that the decision maker is strictly inequality averse (i.e., (1, 1) ≻ (1, 0) and (0, 0) ≻ (0, 1)). On the one
Hence, p and q are equally desirable in regard to equality of opportunity.
On the other hand, by the strict inequality aversion, 1 > e(1, 0) and 0 > e(0, 1). Since e(1, 1) = 1 and e(0,
). Hence, p is preferred to q in regard to equality of outcome. Therefore, the dominance axiom implies that p is at least as good as q. 
A. Parameter Characterization
We can identify the parameters α, β, and δ easily by experiments. We can identify α and β by eliciting real numbers α i and β i such that
6 (Here, we use 1 and −1 just for simplicity. Instead of 1 and −1, we could use any real numbers x and y such that x > y, which would be more appropriate for experiments.) 7 After identifying α and β, we can identify δ by eliciting a real number c such that
In what follows, we characterize the special cases of the EIA model in which δ = 1 and δ = 0. The next axiom characterizes the special case of δ = 1. The axiom means that the decision maker cares only about the expected payoffs. 6 To see that α i and β i are nonnegative, note that by inequality aversion, (0, (0 ) −i ) ≿ (1, (0 ) −i ) and (0, (0 ) −i ) ≿ (−1, (0 ) −i ) for each i ∈ I \{1}. Hence, by monotonicity, α i and β i are nonnegative. 7 In that case,
must be used instead of zero. 8 To see that δ can be smaller than one, note that for inequality-averse subjects, it is natural to assume that
Hence, under monotonicity, c is negative. Thus, δ ≤ 1. 
Axiom (Indifference to Timing of Mixture): For all i ≠ 1,
The other special case of δ = 0 has been used in several papers such as Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) . This special case is characterized by the axiom that states the decision maker is indifferent to probability mixtures.
Axiom (Indifference to Probability Mixture): For all i ≠ 1 and x, y ∈ ℝ such that 
For the other case where
y ≤ 0, the result can be proved in the same way.
The above proposition shows that the two special cases have rather extreme implications for behavior. This would suggest that most of the subjects would exhibit the generic case where δ ∈ (0, 1).
III. Consistency with Experiments
In this section, we show that the EIA model can describe the experimental results in the probabilistic dictator games based on a tractable condition on the parameters (i.e., α, β, and δ). We investigate the probabilistic dictator game because this game provides a direct way to elicit preferences on lotteries over allocations. In addition, the game captures the essence of our parable of two brothers in the introduction.
In the probabilistic dictator games, a common experimental observation is that a substantial fraction of dictators share the probability of winning an indivisible good. For example, Kircher, Ludwig, and Sandroni (2013) asked 60 subjects to choose among receiving one euro, donating one euro to the Red Cross, and randomizing between these two options with equal probability. Kircher, Ludwig, and Sandroni (2013) found that 25 percent of the subjects chose the equal randomization. See Karni, Salmon, and Sopher (2008); Bohnet et al. (2008) ; and Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) for similar experimental evidence.
To see that this experimental finding is consistent with the EIA model, consider a dictator whose preference is represented by the EIA model. The dictator is asked to decide a probability λ ∈ [0, 1] that he will receive the indivisible good ex post. Since the recipient receives the good with the remaining probability 1 − λ, the dictator obtains a lottery p λ ≡ λ(1, 0) ⊕ (1 − λ)(0, 1). 9 Thus, the utility obtained by choosing a probability λ ∈ [0, 1] is as follows:
Under the commonly used assumption that the disutility from envy is larger than that from guilt (i.e., α > β ), the optimal λ * (i.e., the maximizer of (1)) is characterized as follows:
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that α > β. The optimal probability is
is not optimal.
For any λ ∈ [
By the linearity, f attains the maximum at λ = 1 _ 2 or λ = 1. More over,
Therefore, the dictator shares the probability of winning the good if and only if
. Note the similarity between the probabilistic dictator game and the 9 This specification of the allocation is without loss of generality. We can obtain the same result with x and y such that x > y, instead of one and zero. By the linearity of V with respect to constant allocations, V(λ(x, y) The second result in Fudenberg and Levine (2012) shows that there are no preferences that satisfy all of the following four properties: transitivity, a preference for equality of outcome, state independence, and their Property 5 (Correlation Invariance), which states that 1 _
Our theorem is also consistent with this result as well, because any EIA model satisfies transitivity and state independence. (The state independence is satisfied trivially because we assume objective probability without state space.) In addition, the EIA model captures equality of outcome if and only if δ < 1 and (α, β) ≠ 0. Moreover, the EIA model violates Property 5 if and only if δ < 1 and (α, β) ≠ 0. To see this latter equivalence, note that Property 5 implies the indifference between the two lot- Figure 2 , while the EIA model predicts that p is strictly preferred to q if and only if δ < 1 and (α, β) ≠ 0. Borah (2011) proposes a model of social preferences under risk, in which a function g describes a preference for equality of opportunity. The function g is defined solely on the marginal distribution p 2 of a lottery p on the other agent's allocations. Because of this feature, Borah's (2011) model implies unnatural preferences for equality of opportunity.
12 For instance, two lotteries q
(1, 1) must be equally desirable in terms of equality of opportunity, because q 2 = l 2 . (Both marginal distributions on the other agent's allocations are the same 50-50 lottery between zero and one.) However, it would be natural to say that the lottery q is equal in opportunity but the lottery l is unequal in opportunity, saito: social preferences under risk Vol. 103 no. 7 because in q both agents have an equal chance to get one, but in l only the decision maker gets one with certainty.
In contrast, the EIA model captures a preference for equality of opportunity through the term U( E p 1 ( x 1 ), E p 2 ( x 2 )). (Note that E p ( x i ) = E p i ( x i ) for each i ∈ I.) This term depends not only on p 2 but also on the marginal distribution p 1 of a lottery p on the decision maker's allocations. Because of this difference between the EIA model and Borah's (2011) model, neither model is a special case of the other. In fact, if δ > 0 and (α, β) ≠ 0, then the EIA model predicts that the decision maker will feel disutilities from inequality in opportunity in the lottery l
. In a deterministic environment, Rohde (2010) also obtains a characterization of Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model. Rohde's (2010) axioms differ from ours. Rohde's (2010) results and ours were obtained simultaneously and independently. Moreover, since Rohde (2010) studies a deterministic environment, she does not consider the trade-off between the two notions of equality, which is the main issue in our article.
V. Concluding Remark
One important feature of the EIA model is that the model reduces into the function U proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the set of deterministic allocations. To conclude the article, we discuss an extension to incorporate other models of social preferences.
To state the extension, first we need to define a property of a function U on ℝ n . U is constant linear, if U(λ x + (1 − λ)(c, … , c)) = λU(x) + (1 − λ)U(c, … , c) for all x ∈ ℝ n , c ∈ ℝ, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. In Lemma 3 in the Appendix, we prove the following result. For any binary relation ≿ on Δ( ℝ n ), if (i) there exists a concave and constant linear function U on ℝ n that represents ≿ on ℝ n (i.e., x ≿ y ⇔ U(x) ≥ U(y)) and (ii) ≿ satisfies Rationality, Constant Independence for Probability Mixture, and Dominance, then there exists
Note that Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model satisfies the concavity and the certainty linearity. Charness and Rabin's (2002) model, U CR (x) ≡ (1 − λ) x 1 + λ(γ ∑ i∈I x i + (1 − γ)mi n i∈I x i ), also satisfies the two properties. Therefore, if the function U CR represents ≿ on ℝ n and ≿ satisfies the all properties in the condition (ii) above, then Lemma 3 shows that there exists
Appendix: Proof of Theorem and Remark
To prove the main theorem and the remark, we will prove three lemmas. Lemma 1 provides the representation theorem of the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Lemma 2 shows a representation theorem on a subset of ℝ 2 . By using Lemma 2, Lemma 3 proves the result mentioned in Section V. The proofs of the theorem and the remark are in Section D.
A. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
The necessity of the axioms is trivial. In the following, we show the sufficiency. Fix ≿ that satisfies the axioms.
Step 1: There exists a utility function U : ℝ n → ℝ such that (i) for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ ℝ n , if x and y are quasi-comonotonic, then U(λ x + (1 − λ)y) = λU(x) + (1 − λ)U(y), (ii) for all x ∈ ℝ n and a ∈ ℝ + , U(a x) = aU(x), and (iii) U is unique up to positive affine transformation.
PROOF OF STEP 1:
Since an equal allocation (z, … , z) is quasi-comonotonic with any other allocations, Quasi-Comonotonic Independence for Outcome Mixture implies that for all x, y ∈ ℝ n , z ∈ ℝ, and λ ∈ (0, 1), x ≿ y ⇔ λ x + (1 − λ)(z, … , z) ≿ λy + (1 − λ) × (z, … , z). By the standard argument with the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem, the above property implies that there exists a utility function U on ℝ n such that for all x ∈ ℝ n , z ∈ ℝ, and λ ∈ (0, 1),
In addition, U is unique up to positive affine transformation, so that (iii) holds. Hence, we can normalize U by U(1, … , 1) = 1 and U(−1, … , −1) = −1, without loss of generality. Then, U(0, … , 0) = 0. Therefore, (A1) shows that for all x ∈ ℝ and a ∈ [0, 1] such that a ≤ 1, U(a x) = aU(x). For all x ∈ ℝ and a > 1,
To show (i), choose λ ∈ [0, 1] and x, y ∈ ℝ n such that x and y are quasicomonotonic. By (ii), there exists a positive integer n such that 1
In addition, 1 _ n x and 1 _ n y are also quasi-comonotonic. Hence, Quasi-Comonotonic Independence for Outcome Mixture shows that λ ( 1
. Therefore, by using (A1) and (ii), social preferences under risk Vol. 103 no. 7 For all i ≠ 1, define α i = −U(1, (0 ) −i ) and β i = −U(−1, (0 ) −i ). By Inequality Aversion, α i ≥ 0 and β i ≥ 0 for all i ≠ 1. Fix any x ∈ ℝ n .
Step 2: Let
(ii) and (iii) can be proved in the same way.
By the steps, the following calculations complete the proof of Lemma 1.
Let D be a subset of ℝ 2 and let  ≿ be a binary relation on D.  ≻ and  ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  ≿ , respectively. 
Hence, Lemma 2 holds for δ = 1. In the following, we assume ( a * , a
. Then by Constant Continuity, there exist
,  a > a * , and  a >  b . Let T be a triangle including the interior which consists of the vertices (
, where 〈⋅ , ⋅〉 is an inner product.) In the following, we show the existence of the desired δ ∈ [0, 1] on T and then extend the result on D.
Step 1:
Step 2: There exists δ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any (a, b),
PROOF OF STEP 2:
Substep 2.1: For all (a, b) ∈ T , there exists a unique number
PROOF OF SUBSTEP 2.1: 
, so that Substep 2.2 is proved. Define
However, by Monotonicity (ii), ( a * + ε, a 
Substeps 2.3 and 2.4 establish Step 2.
Step 3: For all (a, b), saito: social preferences under risk Vol. 103 no. 7 Step 2: D satisfies the properties (i), (ii), and (iii) in Lemma 2.
To show (i), it suffices to show that U( E p (x)) ≥ E p (U(x)) for all p ∈ Δ( ℝ n ). Since U is concave, Jensen's Inequality shows that U( E p (x)) ≥ E p (U(x)) for all p ∈ Δ( ℝ n ). Property (ii) holds by the constant linearity of U. To see (iii) holds, note that for any
Step 3: v is a well-defined weakly increasing function.
PROOF OF STEP 3:
To show that v is well defined, it suffices to show that Step 4:  ≿ satisfies the all properties in Lemma 2 (i.e., Completeness, Transitivity, Monotonicity, Constant Independence, and Constant Continuity).
PROOF OF STEP 4:
Since v is a well-defined increasing function,  ≿ satisfies Completeness, Transitivity, and Monotonicity (i). Moreover, (c, c)  ≿ ( c′ , c′ ) ⇔ v(c, c) ≥ v( c′ , c′ ) ⇔ V(c, … , c) ≥ V( c′ , … , c′ ) ⇔ c ≥ c′ ; hence, Monotonicity (ii) is also satisfied.
Constant Independence follows from Step 1 and the constant linearity of U. To see this, choose any (a, b), ( a′ , b′ ), (z, z) ∈ D and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there exist lotteries p and q such that (a, b) = (U ( E p (x) ), E p (U(x))) and ( a′ , b′ ) = (U( E q (x)), E q (U(x))). To simplify notation, let p′ = λp ⊕ (1 − λ)(z, … , z) and q′ = λq ⊕ (1 − λ) × (z, … , z). By Step 1(i), then (a, b)  ≿ ( a′ , b′ ) ⇔ V( p) ≥ V(q) ⇔ V( p′ ) ≥ V( q′ ) ⇔ (U( E p ′ (x)), E p ′ (U(x)))  ≿ (U( E q ′ (x)), E q ′ (U(x))). Moreover, by the constant linearity of U, (U( E p ′ (x)), E p ′ (U(x))) = λ(a, b) + (1 − λ)(z, z) and (U( E q ′ (x)), E q ′ (U(x))) = λ( a′ , b′ ) + (1 − λ) (z, z) . This completes the proof of Constant Independence.
Finally, we show that  ≿ satisfies Constant Continuity. Choose any (a, b),( a′ , b′ ), (z, z) ∈ D such that (a, b)  ≿ ( a′ , b′ )  ≿ (z, z). Then, there exist p, q ∈ Δ( ℝ n ) such that (U( E p (x)), E p (U(x))) = (a, b) and (U( E q (x)), E q (U(x))) = ( a′ , b′ ). Then p ≿ q ≿ (z, … , z). Then by Continuity, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that q ∼ λ p ⊕ (1 − λ)(z, … , z). By definition, this implies that ( a′ , b′ )  ∼ λ(a, b) + (1 − λ)(z, z). The other case where (z, z)  ≿ ( a′ , b′ )  ≿ (a, b) is proved in the same way.
Given Steps 2 and 4 and Lemma 2, it follows that p ≿ q ⇔ V( p) ≥ V(q) ⇔ (U ( E p (x) ), E p (U(x)))  ≿ (U( E q (x)), E q (U(x))) ⇔ δU( E p (x)) + (1 − δ ) E p (U(x)) ≥ δU( E q (x)) + (1 − δ) E q (U(x)) for all p, q ∈ Δ( ℝ n ). This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
D. Proof of Theorem and Remark
The necessity of the axioms is trivial. To show Continuity, note that the EIA model is a weighted sum of max functions. The sufficiency follows from Lemmas 1 and 3 because U(x) = x 1 − ∑ i=2 n ( α i max{ x i − x 1 , 0} + β i max{ x 1 − x i , 0}) is concave and constant linear.
14
In the following, we provide the proof of Remark. Suppose that (δ, α, β) and ( δ′ , α′ , β′ ) represent ≿. Let V and V ′ be the functions defined by (δ, α, β) and ( δ′ , α′ , β′ ), respectively.
First, we show (α, β) = ( α′ , β′ ). Suppose to the contrary that (α, β) ≠ ( α′ , β′ ). Second, we show that if (α, β) ≠ 0, then δ = δ′ . Suppose to the contrary that (α, β) ≠ 0 but δ ≠ δ′ . Without loss of generality, assume δ > δ′ and
